Backdoor attacks pose a significant threat to deep learning models by implanting hidden vulnerabilities that can be activated by malicious inputs. While numerous defenses have been proposed to mitigate these attacks, the heterogeneous landscape of evaluation methodologies hinders fair comparison between defenses. This work presents a systematic (meta-)analysis of backdoor defenses through a comprehensive literature review and empirical evaluation. We analyzed 183 backdoor defense papers published between 2018 and 2025 across major AI and security venues, examining the properties and evaluation methodologies of these defenses. Our analysis reveals significant inconsistencies in experimental setups, evaluation metrics, and threat model assumptions in the literature. Through extensive experiments involving three datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-100, ImageNet-1K), four model architectures (ResNet-18, VGG-19, ViT-B/16, DenseNet-121), 16 representative defenses, and five commonly used attacks, totaling over 3\,000 experiments, we demonstrate that defense effectiveness varies substantially across different evaluation setups. We identify critical gaps in current evaluation practices, including insufficient reporting of computational overhead and behavior under benign conditions, bias in hyperparameter selection, and incomplete experimentation. Based on our findings, we provide concrete challenges and well-motivated recommendations to standardize and improve future defense evaluations. Our work aims to equip researchers and industry practitioners with actionable insights for developing, assessing, and deploying defenses to different systems.

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have long been a hot topic in the cybersecurity community. In recent years, with the introduction of deep learning (DL) techniques, IDS have made great progress due to their increasing generalizability. The rationale behind this is that by learning the underlying patterns of known system behaviors, IDS detection can be generalized to intrusions that exploit zero-day vulnerabilities. In this survey, we refer to this type of IDS as DL-based IDS (DL-IDS). From the perspective of DL, this survey systematically reviews all the stages of DL-IDS, including data collection, log storage, log parsing, graph summarization, attack detection, and attack investigation. To accommodate current researchers, a section describing the publicly available benchmark datasets is included. This survey further discusses current challenges and potential future research directions, aiming to help researchers understand the basic ideas and visions of DL-IDS research, as well as to motivate their research interests.

Timely and effective incident response is key to managing the growing frequency of cyberattacks. However, identifying the right response actions for complex systems is a major technical challenge. A promising approach to mitigate this challenge is to use the security knowledge embedded in large language models (LLMs) to assist security operators during incident handling. Recent research has demonstrated the potential of this approach, but current methods are mainly based on prompt engineering of frontier LLMs, which is costly and prone to hallucinations. We address these limitations by presenting a novel way to use an LLM for incident response planning with reduced hallucination. Our method includes three steps: fine-tuning, information retrieval, and lookahead planning. We prove that our method generates response plans with a bounded probability of hallucination and that this probability can be made arbitrarily small at the expense of increased planning time under certain assumptions. Moreover, we show that our method is lightweight and can run on commodity hardware. We evaluate our method on logs from incidents reported in the literature. The experimental results show that our method a) achieves up to 22% shorter recovery times than frontier LLMs and b) generalizes to a broad range of incident types and response actions.

The rise of graph-structured data has driven interest in graph learning and synthetic data generation. While successful in text and image domains, synthetic graph generation remains challenging -- especially for real-world graphs with complex, heterogeneous schemas. Existing research has focused mostly on homogeneous structures with simple attributes, limiting their usefulness and relevance for application domains requiring semantic fidelity. In this research, we introduce ProvCreator, a synthetic graph framework designed for complex heterogeneous graphs with high-dimensional node and edge attributes. ProvCreator formulates graph synthesis as a sequence generation task, enabling the use of transformer-based large language models. It features a versatile graph-to-sequence encoder-decoder that 1. losslessly encodes graph structure and attributes, 2. efficiently compresses large graphs for contextual modeling, and 3. supports end-to-end, learnable graph generation. To validate our research, we evaluate ProvCreator on two challenging domains: system provenance graphs in cybersecurity and knowledge graphs from IntelliGraph Benchmark Dataset. In both cases, ProvCreator captures intricate dependencies between structure and semantics, enabling the generation of realistic and privacy-aware synthetic datasets.

In this paper we present a study on using novel data types to perform cyber risk quantification by estimating the likelihood of a data breach. We demonstrate that it is feasible to build a highly accurate cyber risk assessment model using public and readily available technology signatures obtained from crawling an organization's website. This approach overcomes the limitations of previous similar approaches that relied on large-scale IP address based scanning data, which suffers from incomplete/missing IP address mappings as well as the lack of such data for large numbers of small and medium-sized organizations (SMEs). In comparison to scan data, technology digital signature data is more readily available for millions of SMEs. Our study shows that there is a strong relationship between these technology signatures and an organization's cybersecurity posture. In cross-validating our model using different cyber incident datasets, we also highlight the key differences between ransomware attack victims and the larger population of cyber incident and data breach victims.

We present MADCAT, a self-supervised approach designed to address the concept drift problem in malware detection. MADCAT employs an encoder-decoder architecture and works by test-time training of the encoder on a small, balanced subset of the test-time data using a self-supervised objective. During test-time training, the model learns features that are useful for detecting both previously seen (old) data and newly arriving samples. We demonstrate the effectiveness of MADCAT in continuous Android malware detection settings. MADCAT consistently outperforms baseline methods in detection performance at test time. We also show the synergy between MADCAT and prior approaches in addressing concept drift in malware detection

For the first time, we unveil discernible temporal (or historical) trajectory imprints resulting from adversarial example (AE) attacks. Standing in contrast to existing studies all focusing on spatial (or static) imprints within the targeted underlying victim models, we present a fresh temporal paradigm for understanding these attacks. Of paramount discovery is that these imprints are encapsulated within a single loss metric, spanning universally across diverse tasks such as classification and regression, and modalities including image, text, and audio. Recognizing the distinct nature of loss between adversarial and clean examples, we exploit this temporal imprint for AE detection by proposing TRAIT (TRaceable Adversarial temporal trajectory ImprinTs). TRAIT operates under minimal assumptions without prior knowledge of attacks, thereby framing the detection challenge as a one-class classification problem. However, detecting AEs is still challenged by significant overlaps between the constructed synthetic losses of adversarial and clean examples due to the absence of ground truth for incoming inputs. TRAIT addresses this challenge by converting the synthetic loss into a spectrum signature, using the technique of Fast Fourier Transform to highlight the discrepancies, drawing inspiration from the temporal nature of the imprints, analogous to time-series signals. Across 12 AE attacks including SMACK (USENIX Sec'2023), TRAIT demonstrates consistent outstanding performance across comprehensively evaluated modalities, tasks, datasets, and model architectures. In all scenarios, TRAIT achieves an AE detection accuracy exceeding 97%, often around 99%, while maintaining a false rejection rate of 1%. TRAIT remains effective under the formulated strong adaptive attacks.

Developing high-performance deep learning models is resource-intensive, leading model owners to utilize Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) platforms instead of publicly releasing their models. However, malicious users may exploit query interfaces to execute model extraction attacks, reconstructing the target model's functionality locally. While prior research has investigated triggerable watermarking techniques for asserting ownership, existing methods face significant challenges: (1) most approaches require additional training, resulting in high overhead and limited flexibility, and (2) they often fail to account for advanced attackers, leaving them vulnerable to adaptive attacks. In this paper, we propose Neural Honeytrace, a robust plug-and-play watermarking framework against model extraction attacks. We first formulate a watermark transmission model from an information-theoretic perspective, providing an interpretable account of the principles and limitations of existing triggerable watermarking. Guided by the model, we further introduce: (1) a similarity-based training-free watermarking method for plug-and-play and flexible watermarking, and (2) a distribution-based multi-step watermark information transmission strategy for robust watermarking. Comprehensive experiments on four datasets demonstrate that Neural Honeytrace outperforms previous methods in efficiency and resisting adaptive attacks. Neural Honeytrace reduces the average number of samples required for a worst-case t-Test-based copyright claim from $12,000$ to $200$ with zero training cost.

Federated learning (FL) is a decentralized machine learning technique that allows multiple entities to jointly train a model while preserving dataset privacy. However, its distributed nature has raised various security concerns, which have been addressed by increasingly sophisticated defenses. These protections utilize a range of data sources and metrics to, for example, filter out malicious model updates, ensuring that the impact of attacks is minimized or eliminated. This paper explores the feasibility of designing a generic attack method capable of installing backdoors in FL while evading a diverse array of defenses. Specifically, we focus on an attacker strategy called MIGO, which aims to produce model updates that subtly blend with legitimate ones. The resulting effect is a gradual integration of a backdoor into the global model, often ensuring its persistence long after the attack concludes, while generating enough ambiguity to hinder the effectiveness of defenses. MIGO was employed to implant three types of backdoors across five datasets and different model architectures. The results demonstrate the significant threat posed by these backdoors, as MIGO consistently achieved exceptionally high backdoor accuracy (exceeding 90%) while maintaining the utility of the main task. Moreover, MIGO exhibited strong evasion capabilities against ten defenses, including several state-of-the-art methods. When compared to four other attack strategies, MIGO consistently outperformed them across most configurations. Notably, even in extreme scenarios where the attacker controls just 0.1% of the clients, the results indicate that successful backdoor insertion is possible if the attacker can persist for a sufficient number of rounds.

A collaboration between dataset owners and model owners is needed to facilitate effective machine learning (ML) training. During this collaboration, however, dataset owners and model owners want to protect the confidentiality of their respective assets (i.e., datasets, models and training code), with the dataset owners also caring about the privacy of individual users whose data is in their datasets. Existing solutions either provide limited confidentiality for models and training code, or suffer from privacy issues due to collusion. We present Citadel++, a scalable collaborative ML training system designed to simultaneously protect the confidentiality of datasets, models and training code, as well as the privacy of individual users. Citadel++ enhances differential privacy techniques to safeguard the privacy of individual user data while maintaining model utility. By employing Virtual Machine-level Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and improved integrity protection techniques through various OS-level mechanisms, Citadel++ effectively preserves the confidentiality of datasets, models and training code, and enforces our privacy mechanisms even when the models and training code have been maliciously designed. Our experiments show that Citadel++ provides privacy, model utility and performance while adhering to confidentiality and privacy requirements of dataset owners and model owners, outperforming the state-of-the-art privacy-preserving training systems by up to 543x on CPU and 113x on GPU TEEs.